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Download XMLProtocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and other Devices as amended on 3 May 1996 (Protocol II as amended on 3 May 1996) annexed to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of certain Conventional Weapons which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate Effects
Parties with reservations, declarations and objections
| Party | Reservations / Declarations | Objections |
|---|---|---|
| Austria | Yes | No |
| Belarus | Yes | No |
| Belgium | Yes | No |
| Canada | Yes | No |
| China | Yes | No |
| Denmark | Yes | No |
| Finland | Yes | No |
| France | Yes | No |
| Germany | Yes | No |
| Greece | Yes | No |
| Hungary | Yes | No |
| Ireland | Yes | No |
| Israel | Yes | No |
| Italy | Yes | No |
| Liechtenstein | Yes | No |
| Netherlands, the Kingdom of the | Yes | No |
| Pakistan | Yes | No |
| Republic of Korea, the | Yes | No |
| Russian Federation | Yes | No |
| South Africa | Yes | No |
| Sweden | Yes | No |
| Switzerland | Yes | No |
| Ukraine | Yes | No |
| United Kingdom | Yes | No |
| United States of America | Yes | No |
Austria
27-07-1998
Article 1:
It is the understanding of Austria that the provisions of the amended Protocol which
by their contents or nature may be applied also in peacetime, shall be observed at
all times.
Article 2 (3):
It is the understanding of Austria that the word `primarily' is included in article
2, paragraph 3 of the amended Protocol to clarify that mines designed to be detonated
by the presence, proximity or contact of a vehicle as opposed to a person, that are
equipped with anti-handling devices, are not considered anti-personnel mines as a
result of being so equipped.
Belarus
02-03-2004
[...] according to paragraph 3 c) of the Technical annex of the Amended Protocol II the Republic of Belarus defers the implementation of paragraph 3 b) of the Amended Protocol II for a period of 9 years from the date on which the Amended Protocol II enters into force.
Belgium
10-03-1999
Article 1:
It is the understanding of the Government of the Kingdom of Belgium that the provisions
of Protocol II as amended which by their contents or nature may be applied also in
peacetime, shall be observed at all times.
Article 2:
It is the understanding of the Government of the Kingdom of Belgium that the word
'primarily' is included in article 2, paragraph 3 of amended Protocol II to clarify
that mines designed to be detonated by the presence, proximity or contact of a vehicle
as opposed to a person, that are equipped with anti-handling devices, are not considered
anti-personnel mines as a result of being so equipped.
Canada
19-10-1998
Reservation:
Canada reserves the right to transfer and use a small number of mines prohibited under
this Protocol to be used exclusively for training and testing purposes. Canada will
ensure that the number of such mines shall not exceed that absolutely necessary for
such purposes.
Statements of Understanding:
1. It is understood that the provisions of Amended Protocol II shall, as the context
requires, be observed at all times.
2. It is understood that the word "primarily" is included in Article 2, paragraph
3 of Amended Protocol II to clarify that mines designed to be detonated by the presence,
proximity or contact of a vehicle as opposed to a person, that are equipped with anti-handling
devices, are not considered anti-personnel mines as a result of being so equipped.
3. It is understood that the maintenance of a minefield referred to in Article 10,
in accordance with the standards on marking, monitoring and protection by fencing
or other means set out in Amended Protocol II, would not be considered as a use of
the mines contained therein.
China
04-11-1998
I. According to the provisions contained in Technical Annex 2 (c) and 3 (c) of the
Amended Protocol II, China will defer compliance with 2 (b), 3 (a) and 3 (b);
Article 2 (3):
It is the understanding of China that the word `primarily' is included in article
2, paragraph 3 of the amended Protocol to clarify that mines designed to be detonated
by the presence, proximity or contact of a vehicle as opposed to a person, that are
equipped with anti-handling devices, are not considered anti-personnel mines as a
result of being so equipped.
Denmark
30-04-1997
Article 1:
It is the understanding of Denmark that the provisions of the amended Protocol which
by their contents or nature may be applied also in peacetime, shall be observed at
all times.
Article 2 (3):
It is the understanding of Denmark that the word `primarily' is included in article
2, paragraph 3 of the amended Protocol to clarify that mines designed to be detonated
by the presence, proximity or contact of a vehicle as opposed to a person, that are
equipped with anti-handling devices, are not considered anti-personnel mines as a
result of being so equipped.
Finland
03-04-1998
Article 1:
It is the understanding of Finland that the provisions of the amended Protocol which
by their contents or nature may be applied also in peacetime, shall be observed at
all times.
Article 2 (3):
It is the understanding of Finland that the word `primarily' is included in article
2, paragraph 3 of the amended Protocol to clarify that mines designed to be detonated
by the presence, proximity or contact of a vehicle as opposed to a person, that are
equipped with anti-handling devices, are not considered anti-personnel mines as a
result of being so equipped.
France
23-07-1998
Article 1:
It is the understanding of France that the provisions of the amended Protocol which
by their contents or nature may be applied also in peacetime, shall be observed at
all times.
Article 2 (3):
It is the understanding of France that the word `primarily' is included in article
2, paragraph 3 of the amended Protocol to clarify that mines designed to be detonated
by the presence, proximity or contact of a vehicle as opposed to a person, that are
equipped with anti-handling devices, are not considered anti-personnel mines as a
result of being so equipped.
Article 4:
France takes it that article 4 and Technical Annex to amended Protocol II do not require
the removal or replacement of mines that have already been laid.
Declaration concerning standards on marking, monitoring and protection:
The provisions of amended Protocol II such as those concerning the marking, monitoring
and protection of zones which contain anti-personnel mines and are under the control
of a party, are applicable to all zones containing mines, irrespective of the date
on which those mines were laid.
Germany
02-05-1997
Article 1:
It is the understanding of Germany that the provisions of the amended Protocol which
by their contents or nature may be applied also in peacetime, shall be observed at
all times.
Article 2 (3):
It is the understanding of Germany that the word `primarily' is included in article
2, paragraph 3 of the amended Protocol to clarify that mines designed to be detonated
by the presence, proximity or contact of a vehicle as opposed to a person, that are
equipped with anti-handling devices, are not considered anti-personnel mines as a
result of being so equipped.
Article 5 paragraph 2 (b):
It is understood that article 5, paragraph 2 (b) does not preclude agreement among
the states concerned, in connection with peace treaties or similar arrangements, to
allocate responsibilities under paragraph 2 (b) in another manner which nevertheless
respects the essential spirit and purpose of the article.
Greece
20-01-1999
Article 1:
It is understood that the provisions of the protocol shall, as the context requires,
be observed at all times.
Article 2 (3):
It is the understanding of Greece that the word `primarily' is included in article
2, paragraph 3 of the amended Protocol to clarify that mines designed to be detonated
by the presence, proximity or contact of a vehicle as opposed to a person, that are
equipped with anti-handling devices, are not considered anti-personnel mines as a
result of being so equipped.
Article 5 paragraph 2 (b):
It is understood that article 5, paragraph 2 (b) does not preclude agreement among
the states concerned, in connection with peace treaties or similar arrangements, to
allocate responsibilities under paragraph 2 (b) in another manner which nevertheless
respects the essential spirit and purpose of the article.
Hungary
30-01-1998
Declaration:
The Republic of Hungary
1) declines to observe the 9 year period of deferral on compliance as allowed for
in Paragraphs 2 (c) and 3 (c) of the Technical Annex to Amended Protocol II, and even
prior to the entry into force of Amended Protocol II intends to be bound by its implementation
measures as stipulated therein, as well as the rules of procedure regarding record
keeping, detectability, self-destruction and self-deactivation and perimeter marking
as stipulated in the Technical Annex;
2) intends to eliminate and eventually destroy its entire stockpile of anti-personnel
landmines by December 31, 2000 the latest, in addition to the already undertaken destruction
of stockpiled landmines, as initiated in August of 1996 and completed in 40%;
3) refrains from the emplacement of anti-personnel landmines and, for the duration
of their complete destruction, intends to designate a central storage facility to
pool the remainder stock of anti-personnel landmines as a way to facilitate inspection
by international monitors;
4) announces a total ban on the development, production, acquisition, export and transfer
of all types of anti-personnel landmines;
5) refrains from the operational use of anti-personnel landmines, unless a policy-revision
becomes necessitated by a significant deterioration in the national security environment
of the country, in which case due attention shall be paid to compliance with laws
governing international warfare;
6) stands ready to engage in implementing appropriate confidence building measures,
as a way to be enabled to present the implementation of the measures announced unilaterally
by the Republic of Hungary in the course of joint military, educational, and training
and other cooperational activities conducted with other armed forces;
7) offers appropriate technical and training assistance to international organizations
engaged in de-mining activities;
8) urges her neighbours and other countries in the region to seek unilateral or coordinated
measures designed to achieve the total elimination of all types of anti-personnel
landmines from the weapons arsenal of the countries in the region, and expresses her
readiness to engage in further negotiations to advance this cause;
9) reiterates her commitment to promote the early conclusion of and wide adherence
to an international convention stipulating a total and comprehensive ban on anti-personnel
landmines, by reaffirming her determination to contribute actively to the success
of international efforts furthering this goal.
Ireland
27-03-1997
Article 1:
It is the understanding of Ireland that the provisions of the amended Protocol which
by their contents or nature may be applied also in peacetime, shall be observed at
all times.
Article 2 (3):
It is the understanding of Ireland that the word `primarily' is included in article
2, paragraph 3 of the amended Protocol to clarify that mines designed to be detonated
by the presence, proximity or contact of a vehicle as opposed to a person, that are
equipped with anti-handling devices, are not considered anti-personnel mines as a
result of being so equipped.
Israel
30-10-2000
Article 1:
The declaration made by Israel upon accession to the [Convention], shall be equally
applicable regarding the Amended Protocol II.
Article 2 (3):
Israel understands that the word 'primarily' is included in article 2, paragraph 3
of the Amended Protocol II, to clarify that mines designed to be detonated by the
presence, proximity or contact of vehicles as opposed to persons, that are equipped
with anti-handling devices are not considered Anti-personnel mines as a result of
being so equipped.
Article 3 (9):
Israel understands, regarding article 3, paragraph 9, that an area of land can itself
be a legitimate military objective for the purpose of the use of landmines, if its
neutralization or denial of its use, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers
a definite military advantage.
Article 4:
It is the understanding of the State of Israel, regarding article 4 of the Amended
Protocol II and the Technical Annex, that article 4 of the Amended Protocol II shall
not apply to mines already emplaced. However, provisions of the Amended Protocol II,
such as those regarding marking, monitoring and protection of areas containing mines
under the control of a high contracting party, shall apply to all areas containing
mines, regardless of when the mines were emplaced.
Article 5 (2) (b):
Israel understands that article 5 paragraph 2 (b) does not apply to the transfer of
areas pursuant to peace treaties, agreements on the cessation of hostilities, or as
part of a peace process or steps leading thereto.
Article 7 (f) (1):
Israel reserves the right to use other devices (as defined in Article 2 (5) of the
Amended Protocol II) to destroy any stock of food or drink that is judged likely to
be used by an enemy military force, if due precautions are taken for the safety of
the civilian population.
Article 11 (7):
(a) Israel understands that the provision on technical assistance mentioned on article
11 paragraph 7, will be without prejudice to a High contracting Party's constitutional
and other legal provisions.
(b) No provision of the Amended Protocol II may be construed as affecting the discretion
of the State of Israel to refuse assistance or to restrict or deny permission for
the export equipment, material or scientific or technological information for any
reason.
Article 14:
a) It is the understanding of the Government of the State of Israel that the compliance
of commanders and others responsible for planning, deciding upon, or executing military
actions to which the Convention on Conventional Weapons and its Protocols apply, cannot
be judged on the basis of information which subsequently but comes to light, but must
be assessed on the basis of the information available to them at the time that such
actions were taken.
b) Article 14 of the Amended Protocol II (insofar as it relates to penal sanctions)
shall apply only in a situation in which an individual-
1) Knew, or should have known, that his action was prohibited under the Amended Protocol
II,
2) intended to kill or cause serious injury to a civilian; and
3) knew or should have known, that the person he intended to kill or cause serious
injury to was a civilian.
c) Israel understands that the provisions of article 14 of the amended Protocol II
relating to penal sanctions refer to measures by authorities of States Parties to
the Protocol and do not authorize the trial of any person before an international
criminal tribunal. Israel shall not recognize the jurisdiction of any international
tribunal to prosecute an Israel citizen for violation of the Protocol or the Convention
on Conventional Weapons.
General:
Israel understands that nothing in the Amended Protocol II may be construed as restriction
or affecting in any way non-lethal weapon technology that is designed to temporarily
disable, stun, signal the presence of a person, or operate in any other fashion, but
not to cause permanent incapacity.
Italy
13-01-1999
Article 1:
It is the understanding of Italy that the provisions of the amended Protocol which
by their contents or nature may be applied also in peacetime, shall be observed at
all times.
Article 2:
Under article 2 of the amended Protocol II, in order to fully address the humanitarian
concerns raised by anti-personnel land-mines, the Italian Parliament has enacted and
brought into force a legislation containing a far more stringent definition of those
devices. In this regard, while reaffirming its commitment to promote the further development
of international humanitarian law, the Italian Government confirms its understanding
that the word 'primarily' is included in article 2, paragraph 3 of the amended Protocol
II to clarify that mines designed to be detonated by the presence, proximity or contact
of a vehicle as opposed to a person, that are equipped with anti-handling devices,
are not considered anti-personnel mines as a result of being so equipped.
Article 5, paragraph 2 (b):
Under article 5 of the amended Protocol II, it is the understanding of the Italian
Government that article 5 (paragraph 2) does not preclude agreement in connection
with peace treaties and related agreements among concerned states to allocate responsibilities
under this paragraph in another manner which reflects the spirit and purpose of the
article.
Liechtenstein
19-11-1997
Article 1:
It is the understanding of Liechtenstein that the provisions of the amended Protocol
which by their contents or nature may be applied also in peacetime shall be observed
at all times.
Netherlands, the Kingdom of the
25-03-1999
With regard to Article 1, paragraph 2:
The Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands takes the view that the provisions
of the Protocol which, given their content or nature, can also be applied in peacetime,
must be observed in all circumstances.
With regard to Article 2, paragraph 3:
The Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands takes the view that the word 'primarily'
means only that mines that are designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity
or contact of a vehicle and that are equipped with an anti-handling device are not
regarded as anti-personnel mines because of that device.
With regard to Article 2, paragraph 6:
The Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands takes the view that a specific area
of land may also be a military objective if, because of its location or other reasons
specified in paragraph six, its total or partial destruction, capture, or neutralization
in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definitive military advantage.
With regard to Article 3, paragraph 8, under c:
The Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands takes the view that military advantage
refers to the advantage anticipated from the attack considered as a whole and not
only from isolated or particular parts of the attack.
With regard to Article 12, paragraph 2, under b:
The Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands takes the view that the words 'as
far as it is able' mean 'as far as it is technically able'
Pakistan
09-03-1999
Article 1:
- It is understood that for the purposes of interpretation the provisions of article
1 take precedence over provisions or undertakings in any other article.
- The rights and obligations arising from situations described in article 1 are absolute
and immutable and the observance of any other provision of the Protocol cannot be
construed, either directly or indirectly, as affecting the right of peoples struggling
against colonial or other forms of alien domination and foreign occupation in the
exercise of their inalienable right of self-determination, as enshrined in the Charter
of the United Nations and the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning
Friendly Relations and Co-operation among states in accordance with the Charter of
the United Nations.
- The provisions of the Protocol must be observed at all times, depending on the circumstances.
Article 2 (Paragraph 3):
- In the context of the word "primarily", it is understood that such anti-tank mines
which use anti-personnel mines as a fuse but do not explode on contact with a person
are not anti-personnel mines.
Article 3 (Paragraph 9):
- It is understood that an area of land can itself be a legitimate military objective
for the purposes of the use of landmines, if its neutralisation or denial, in the
circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.
Sub-paras 2(c) and 3(c) of Technical Annex:
- It is declared that compliance with sub-paras 2(b) and 3(a) and (b) is deferred
as provided for in sub-paras 2(c) and 3(c), respectively.
Republic of Korea, the
09-05-2001
I. Reservation
With respect to the application of Protocol II to the 1980 Convention, as amended
on 3 May 1996 ("Amended Mines Protocol"), the Republic of Korea reserves the right
to use a small number of mines prohibited under this Protocol exclusively for training
and testing purposes.
II. Declarations
It is the understanding of the Republic of Korea that:
1. With respect to Article 3(8)(a) of the Amended Mines Protocol, in case there is
an evident indication that an object which is normally dedicated to civilian purposes,
such as a place of worship, a house or other dwelling or a school, is being used to
make an effective contribution to military action, it shall be considered as a military
object.
2. Article 4 and the Technical Annex of the Amended Mines Protocol do not require
the removal or replacement of mines that have already been laid.
3. "Cessation of active hostilities" provided for in Articles 9(2) and 10(1) of the
Amended Mines Protocol is interpreted as meaning the time when the present Armistice
regime on the Korean peninsula has been transformed into a peace regime, establishing
a stable peace on the Korean peninsula.
4. Any decision by any military commander, military personnel, or any other person
responsible for planning, authorizing, or executing military action shall only be
judged on the basis of that person's assessment of the information reasonably available
to the person at the time the person planned, authorized, or executed that action
under review, and shall not be judged on the basis of information that comes to light
after the action under review was taken.
Russian Federation
02-03-2005
1. For the purposes of interpreting subparagraph 10 (c) of article 3, of Protocol
II, the Russian Federation understands alternatives as non-flying devices and technologies
which are not anti-personnel mines and may temporarily disable, paralyse or indicate
the presence of one or several persons without causing irreversible harm to them;
2. In implementing subparagraph 2 (a) of article 5, of Protocol II, the Russian Federation
holds the position that anti-personnel mines which are not remotely-delivered will
be placed within perimeter-marked areas which are monitored by military personnel
and protected by fencing or other means, to ensure the effective exclusion of civilians
from such areas. Such marking must be of a distinct and durable character and must
at least be visible to a person who is about to enter the perimeter-marked area. The
line of the State border designated in the locality may be considered as the marking
(designation) of part of the perimeter of a mined area within the border zone when
there are active and repeated attempts to traverse it by armed intruders or when military,
economic, physical and geographic, or other conditions make it impossible to use armed
forces. The civilian population will be informed in good time about the danger of
the mines and will not be allowed into the mined area;
3. For the purposes of interpreting subparagraph 1 (i) of article 7, of Protocol II,
the Russian Federation understands the cultural or spiritual heritage of peoples as
cultural property in the terms of article 1 of the Convention for the Protection of
Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict of 1954;
4. The Russian Federation understands the commonly available technical mine detection
equipment referred to in paragraph 2 (a) of the Technical Annex to Protocol II as
the mine-searching equipment which is available in the Russian Federation and meets
the requirements of the aforementioned paragraph;
5. In accordance with paragraph 2 (c) and paragraph 3 (c) of the Technical Annex to
Protocol II, the Russian Federation will ensure the observance of paragraph 2 (b)
and paragraphs 3 (a) and 3 (b) of the Technical Annex to Protocol II not later than
nine years from the date of the entry into force of the said Protocol.
South Africa
26-06-1998
Article 1:
It is the understanding of South Africa that the provisions of the amended Protocol
which by their contents or nature may be applied also in peacetime, shall be observed
at all times.
Article 2 (3):
It is the understanding of South Africa that the word `primarily' is included in article
2, paragraph 3 of the amended Protocol to clarify that mines designed to be detonated
by the presence, proximity or contact of a vehicle as opposed to a person, that are
equipped with anti-handling devices, are not considered anti-personnel mines as a
result of being so equipped.
Article 5 paragraph 2 (b):
It is understood that Article 5 (2) (b) does not preclude agreement among the States
concerned, in connection with peace treaties or similar arrangements, to allocate
responsibilities under this paragraph in another manner which nevertheless respects
the essential spirit and purpose of the Article.
Sweden
16-07-1997
Articles 1 and 2:
Sweden intends to apply the Protocol also in time of peace.
Article 2 (3):
It is the understanding of Ireland that the word `primarily' is included in article
2, paragraph 3 of the amended Protocol to clarify that mines designed to be detonated
by the presence, proximity or contact of a vehicle as opposed to a person, that are
equipped with anti-handling devices, are not considered anti-personnel mines as a
result of being so equipped.
Article 5, paragraph 2:
Sweden is of the opinion that the obligations ensuing from article 5, paragraph 2
shall not be interpreted to the effect that the High Contracting Parties or parties
in a conflict are prevented from entering into an agreement allowing another party
to conduct mine clearance.
Switzerland
24-03-1998
Article 2, paragraph 3:
Switzerland interprets the definition of "anti-personnel mine" as excluding any mine
designed to explode in the presence or proximity of, or upon contact with, a vehicle,
when such mine is equipped with an anti-handling device.
Ukraine
15-12-1999
Ukraine declares that it shall defer implementation of the provisions of subparagraphs
3 (a) and (b) of the technical annex for a period of nine years from the date on which
this Protocol enters into force.
United Kingdom
11-02-1999
Declarations:
(a) the [declaration conveying consent to be bound by Protocols I, II and III to the
Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Conventional Weapons which
may be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects, concluded
at Geneva on 10 October 1980], in so far as it applies to Protocol II to the [1980]
Convention, continues to apply to Protocol II as amended;
(b) the [declaration dated 28 January 1998 accompanying the United Kingdom's ratification
of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 relating to the
Protection of Victims of Armed Conflicts, opened for signature at Geneva on 12 December
1977], in so far as it is relevant, also applies to the provisions of Protocol II
as amended;
(c) nothing in the present declaration or in Protocol II as amended shall be taken
as limiting the obligations of the United Kingdom under the [Convention on the Prohibition
and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction concluded at Oslo on
18 September 1997 (the "Ottawa Convention")] nor its rights in relation to other Parties
to that Convention;
(d) Article 2 (14) is interpreted to have the same meaning as Article 2 (3) of the
Ottawa Convention;
(e) the references in Article 12 (2) to "force" and "mission" are interpreted as including
forces and missions authorised by the United Nations Security Council under Chapter
VII or Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations which are deployed by a regional
arrangement or agency. This applies to all such forces or missions, whether or not
they include contingents contributed by non-member States of the regional arrangement
or agency.
United States of America
24-05-1999
I. The senate's advice and consent is subject to the following reservation:
The United States reserves the right to use other devices (as defined in Article 2(5)
of the Amended Mines Protocol) to destroy any stock of food or drink that is judged
likely to be used by an enemy military force, if due precautions are taken for the
safety of the civilian population.
II. The Senate's advice and consent is subject to the following understandings:
(1) United States compliance, - The United States understands that -
(A) any decision by any military commander, military personnel, or any other person
responsible for planning, authorizing, or executing military action shall only be
judged on the basis of that person's assessment of the information reasonably available
to the person at the time the person planned, authorized, or executed the action under
review, and shall not be judged on the basis of information that comes to light after
the action under review was taken; and
(B) Article 14 of the Amended Mines Protocol (insofar as it relates to penal sanctions)
shall apply only in a situation in which an individual -
(i) knew, or should have known, that his action was prohibited under the Amended Mines
Protocol;
(ii) intended to kill or cause serious injury to a civilian; and
(iii) knew or should have known, that the person he intended to kill or cause serious
injury was a civilian.
(2) Effective exclusion. - The United States understands that, for the purposes of
Article 5(6)(b) of the Amended Mines Protocol, the maintenance of observation over
avenues of approach where mines subject to that Article are deployed constitutes one
acceptable form of monitoring to ensure the effective exclusion of civilians.
(3) Historic monuments. - The United states understands that Article 7(1)(i) of the
Amended Mines Protocol refers only to a limited class of objects that, because of
their clearly recognizable characteristics and because of their widely recognized
importance, constitute a part of the cultural or spiritual heritage of peoples.
(4) Legitimate military objectives. - The United States understands that an area of
land itself can be a legitimate military objective for the purpose of the use of landmines,
if its neutralization or denial, in the circumstances applicable at the time, offers
a military advantage.
(5) Peace treaties. - The United States understands that the allocation of responsibilities
for landmines in Article 5(2)(b) of the Amended Mines Protocol does not preclude agreement,
in connection with peace treaties or similar arrangements, to allocate responsibilities
under that Article in a manner that respects the essential spirit and purpose of the
Article.
(6) Booby-traps and other devices. - For the purposes of the Amended Mines Protocol,
the United States understands that -
(A) the prohibition contained in Article 7(2) of the Amended Mines Protocol does not
preclude the expedient adaptation or adaptation in advance of other objects for use
as booby-traps or other devices;
(B) a trip-wired hand grenade shall be considered a "booby-trap" under Article 2(4)
of the Amended Mines Protocol and shall not be considered a "mine" or an "anti-personnel
mine" under Article 2(1) or Article 2(3), respectively; and
(C) none of the provisions of the Amended Mines Protocol, including Article 2(5),
applies to hand grenades other than trip-wired hand grenades.
(7) Non-lethal capabilities. - The United States understands that nothing in the Amended
Mines Protocol may be construed as restricting or affecting in any way non-lethal
weapon technology that is designed to temporarily disable, stun, signal the presence
of a person, or operate in any other fashion, but not to cause permanent incapacity.
(8) International Tribune jurisdiction. - The United States understands that the provisions
of Article 14 of the Amended Mines Protocol relating to penal sanctions refer to measures
by the authorities of States Parties to the Protocol and do not authorize the trial
of any person before an international criminal tribunal. The United States shall not
recognize the jurisdiction of any international tribunal to prosecute a United States
citizen for a violation of the Protocol or the Convention on Conventional Weapons.
(9) Technical Cooperation and Assistance. - The United States understands that -
(A) no provision of the Protocol may be construed as affecting the discretion of the
United States to refuse assistance or to restrict or deny permission for the export
of equipment, material, or scientific or technological information for any reason;
and
(B) the Amended Mines Protocol may not be used as a pretext for the transfer of weapons
technology or the provision of assistance to the military mining or military counter-mining
capabilities of a State Party to the Protocol.