Alomvattend Kernstopverdrag
Partijen met voorbehouden, verklaringen en bezwaren
Partij | Voorbehoud / verklaring | Bezwaren |
---|---|---|
China | Ja | Nee |
Colombia | Ja | Nee |
Duitsland | Ja | Nee |
Guatemala | Ja | Nee |
Heilige Stoel | Ja | Nee |
Iran | Ja | Nee |
Israël | Ja | Nee |
Libanon | Ja | Nee |
China
24-09-1996
1. China has all along stood for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction
of nuclear weapons and the realization of a nuclear-weapon-free world. It is in favor
of a comprehensive ban on nuclear weapon test explosions in the process towards this
objective. China is deeply convinced that the CTBT will facilitate nuclear disarmament
and nuclear nonproliferation. Therefore, China supports the conclusion, through negotiation,
of a fair, reasonable and verifiable treaty with universal adherence and unlimited
duration and is ready to take active measures to promote its ratification and entry
into force.
2. Meanwhile, the Chinese Government solemnly makes the following appeals:
(1) Major nuclear weapon states should abandon their policy of nuclear deterrence.
States with huge nuclear arsenals should continue to drastically reduce their nuclear
stockpiles.
(2) All countries that have deployed nuclear weapons on foreign soil should withdraw
all of them to their own land. All nuclear weapon states should undertake not to be
the first to use nuclear weapons at any time and under any circumstances, commit themselves
unconditionally to the non-use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear
weapon states or nuclear weapon-free zones, and conclude, at an early date, international
legal instruments to this effect.
(3) All nuclear weapon states should pledge their support to proposals for the establishment
of nuclear weapon-free zones, respect their status as such and undertake corresponding
obligations.
(4) No country should develop or deploy space weapon systems or missile defence systems
undermining strategic security and stability.
(5) An international convention on the complete prohibition and thorough destruction
of nuclear weapons should be concluded through negotiations.
3. The Chinese Government endorses the application of verification measures consistent
with the provisions of the CTBT to ensure its faithful implementation and at the same
time it firmly opposes the abuse of verification rights by any country, including
the use of espionage or human intelligence, to infringe upon the sovereignty of China
and impair its legitimate security interests in violation of universally recognized
principles of international law.
4 . In the present day world where huge nuclear arsenals and nuclear deterrence policy
based on the first use of nuclear weapons still exist, the supreme national interests
of China demand that it ensure the safety, reliability and effectiveness of its nuclear
weapons before the goal of eliminating all nuclear weapons is achieved.
5. The Chinese Government and people are ready to continue to work together with governments
and peoples of other countries for an early realization of the lofty goal of the complete
prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons.
Colombia
29-01-2008
The Government of Colombia declares that the financial obligations arising from the present instrument shall not become payable until the Treaty has entered into force and shall not have retroactive effect.
Duitsland
24-09-1996
It is the understanding of the German Government that nothing in this Treaty shall ever be interpreted or applied in such a way as to prejudice or prevent research into and development of controlled thermonuclear fusion and its economic use.
Guatemala
12-01-2012
The Government of Guatemala declares that the financial obligations arising from the present Treaty will only become payable as from the date of entry into force of the Treaty and shall not have retroactive effect.
Heilige Stoel
24-09-1996
The Holy See is convinced that in the sphere of nuclear weapons, the banning of tests
and of the further development of these weapons, disarmament and non-proliferation
are closely linked and must be achieved as quickly as possible under effective international
controls.
Furthermore, the Holy See understands that these are steps towards a general and total
disarmament which the international community as a whole should accomplish without
delay.
18-07-2001
The Holy See, in ratifying the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), adopted
by the United Nations General Assembly on 10 September 1996 and signed by the Holy
See on 24 September of the same year, wishes to repeat what was said when it added
its signature: "The Holy See is convinced that in the sphere of nuclear weapons, the
banning of tests and of the further development of these weapons, disarmament and
non-proliferation are closely linked and must be achieved as quickly as possible under
effective international controls".
In conformity with the nature and particular condition of Vatican City State, the
Holy See, by this ratification, seeks to advance the genuine promotion of a culture
of peace based upon the primacy of law and of respect for human life. At the beginning
of the third millennium, the implementation of a system of comprehensive and complete
disarmament, capable of fostering a climate of trust, cooperation and respect between
all States, represents an indispensable aspect of the concrete realization of a culture
of life and peace.
In lending moral support to the CTBT through this solemn act of ratification, the
Holy See encourages the whole International Community, which is aware of the various
challenges standing in the way of nuclear disarmament, to intensify its efforts to
ensure the implementation of the said Treaty.
Iran
24-09-1996
1. The Islamic Republic of Iran considers that the Treaty does not meet nuclear disarmament
criteria as originally intended. We had not perceived a CTBT only as non-proliferation
instrument. The Treaty must have terminated fully and comprehensive further development
of nuclear weapons. However, the Treaty bans explosions, thus limiting such development
only in certain aspects, while leaving others avenues wide open. We see no other way
for the CTBT to be meaningful, however, unless it is considered as a step towards
a phased program for nuclear disarmament with specific time frames through negotiations
on a consecutive series of subsequent treaties.
2. On National Technical Means, based on the deliberation that took place on the issues
in the relevant Ad Hoc Committee of the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, we interpret
the text as according a complementary role to them and reiterate that they should
be phased out with further development of the International Monitoring System. National
Technical Means should not be interpreted to include information received from espionage
and human intelligence.
3. The inclusion of Israel in the MESA grouping constitutes a politically-motivated
aberration from UN practice and is thus objectionable. We express our strong reservation
on the matter and believe that it will impede the implementation of the Treaty, as
the confrontation of the States in this regional group would make it tremendously
difficult for the Executive Council to form. The Conference of the States Parties
would eventually be compelled to find a way to redress this problem.
Israël
29-01-1997
Israel considers that Iran's declaration on this matter has no legal basis and is
entirely motivated by political reasons extraneous to the CTBT.
The Iranian declaration attempts to undermine the implementation of the treaty and
is incompatible with both the Treaty and its spirit, as well as with the U.N. Charter
principle of sovereign equality of all states.
Israel, by geography, is part of the Middle-East region, and no objection will change
this.
Israel calls upon other signatories of the CTBT to express their rejection of the
Iranian reservation to Israel's inclusion in the MESA Geographic region, as well as
the threat contained therein.
Libanon
03-10-2005
We express our reservation on the inclusion of Israel in MESA grouping, which constittutes
an aberration from UN practice and it will impede the implementation of the treaty.
We believe strongly that the confrontation of the states in this regional group would
make it tremendously difficult to form the Executive Council. The Conference of the
States Parties would be compelled to find a way to redress this problem.